ABSTRACT
The history of the Prussian army between 1713 and 1830 is usually presented in terms of military achievement at the expense of social, economic and political development. Frederick William I create a formidable war-fighting instrument at the price of organizing Prussian society for war-making. The Seven Years' War thus did not direcdy challenge the parameters of the contract between Prussia and its soldiers. It did, however, confirm in Frederick's mind the vital importance to Prussia's state strategy of synthesizing technical procedures and willpower in a military system based on an endless capacity for taking pains. Since the end of the Seven Years' War, Prussia had courted, sometimes at high prices, good relations with Russia. The collapse of Prussia's state strategy in 1805-6 is often ascribed to the culpable short-sightedness of Frederick William III and his advisers in regard to French intentions, or to irreconcilable factionalism at decision-making levels.
