ABSTRACT
In structural terms the Treaty of Rome had been a political mix of intergovernmental and federal characteristics. It indicated, perhaps, the uncertainty or rather the difference of opinion within the Six as to what structure the EEC should possess. The resolution of the 1965 crisis effectively swung the balance towards intergovernmentalism. What 1965 meant was that for the foreseeable future at least, the EEC would advance as a unit of independent states, or it would not advance at all. The new kind of Community would be reinforced by the developments of the 1970s. On the other hand, there remained within the Community a widespread acceptance of its aims: important national groups and associations increasingly tended to define their interests and values and to plot their actions with reference to the EEC, and public opinion was consistently in favour of unification. The economies were becoming more interlocked, with intra-EEC trade having grown since 1958 at almost triple the rate of that with third countries. And despite the climacterics of the mid-1960s, the governments of the Six still professed a basic acceptance of the value of the EEC. In the face of French obstructionism the other five had had to accept that the alternative of risking the destruction of the Community over the issue of British membership was unthinkable. On the other side, France had to accept the need to pursue at least some elements of the EEC timetable in order to preserve its own influence. Despite its boycott and the worries of its associates, France did cut internal tariffs at the end of 1965 according to schedule. There was, in other words, a realisation among all of the fundamental importance of the Community. Integration had become, at the governmental level, a positive political concept like democracy; but like democracy the problem was that it was prone to many different interpretations.
