ABSTRACT
The war in 1939 did not shatter a flourishing and stable economic order; some argue that it was itself the ultimate expression of economic dislocation. By 1937 the British index was at 118 and the American at 96. However, if 1932 is chosen as the base, then the American recovery from 63 to 96 was steeper than the British recovery from 99 to 118. Again, the relatively poor performance of Britain after 1925 helps to explain the relative mildness of the depression in Britain in the late 1920s. Cross-national and cross-cultural comparisons are inevitable, but they can be misleading. Some economists thought that this kind of 'pegging' still indicated a yearning for an unobtainable fixed parity. Some economists blame the depreciation of sterling for the collapse of respect for an international monetary standard and the ensuing network of currency restrictions. Low interest rates did in fact prevail, though they were not seen as part of a Keynesian economic programme.
