ABSTRACT
Under a system of representative government public support for sustaining a war has often begun to erode in the third or fourth year of hostilities regardless of whether the war was being won or lost. At the end of 1759 Britain was definitely winning, and since people in general preferred peace they tended to agree with the Duke of Newcastle that it was time to begin negotiations. Yet there were strong arguments for keeping the war going. Because the French navy had been crushed and confined the prospects of further reducing French trade and seizing French colonies were excellent. Moreover, the nation’s economy was in a remarkably prosperous condition, and while British foreign and domestic trade thrived, French foreign trade was practically annihilated. On the other side of the ledger was the rising expense. Supplies voted by Parliament had increased from £8.5 million in 1757 to £10.5 in 1758, £12.8 in 1759, and would be estimated at £15.5 million for 1760. Sums above the annual revenue of £8.5 million had to be borrowed.1 Although there was little sign of serious financial difficulty (the reasons for this are considered in the concluding chapter), people worried about the national debt. This was a principal reason why the British public, on balance, favoured peace.
