ABSTRACT
It was no accident that Khmelnytsky's revolt began at the end of the longest period of peace the Commonwealth had known since 1558. Although it had adapted effectively to the rapidly-changing circumstances of contemporary warfare, there were serious shortcomings in the Commonwealth's military structure which were exposed after 1648. The principal problem was the failure to develop a permanent framework within which its semi-professional forces could develop. This was in part a consequence of the way in which its armies were sustained. The Commonwealth had fought its wars largely on the proceeds of taxation, yet its s;dachta citizens remained deeply attached to the ideal of the domain state. For them, taxation was extraordinary: it was to be under the tight control of the citizens, without whose consent it could not be voted, and it was temporary, voted for limited periods, from one Sf!jm to the next, to cover necessary expenses. Otherwise, the infrastructure of defence was to be provided out of the royal domain. As the 1615 Sijm reminded Sigismund, he had promised in his electoral charter to build and maintain a fleet, and to sustain 'the apparatus of war' at his own expense; proposals, such as that made at the Sieradz sgmik in 1632, suggesting that a set number of royal estates be set aside to support the construction of a fleet, were common.!
