ABSTRACT
Nonetheless, in defiance of good sense and lessons that should have been learned from history, historical revisionism Japanese-style and calls to restore Japan's dignity by revising Tokyo's post-war Constitution arguably sound less absurd to a smaller number among Japan's electorate and public than before December 2012. To be sure, government-sponsored nationalism at home accompanied by very assertive and at times aggressive policies related to territorial claims are part of China's and not Japan's regional security behaviour. While policymakers in Beijing beg to differ strongly, recent and ongoing changes and developments on Tokyo's security and defence policy agenda do not provide any evidence that Japanese nationalist, revisionist thinking and rhetoric is about to translate into aggressive and revisionist Japanese foreign and security policies. The constitutional reinterpretation and indeed revision have been on top of Abe's policy agenda ever since he came to power in December 2012, the issue of collective self-defence has been on Japan's policy agenda for last 20 years.
