ABSTRACT
This chapter considers how close-knit relations and associated social norms fit into ideas of policy stability and change, and how such norms hinder and encourage good policy making. Lobbyists have been painfully aware of their image and the consequences of publicity. The social process of lobbying also provides new insights into John King-don's (1995) 'garbage can' model of policy change. Large body of evidence shows that giving ordinary people power over others cans them selfish and insensitive. Formal political institutions foster deep and durable ties by creating conditions of repeated exchange, rewards for cooperation, and positive incentives for collective action. Social Ambivalence ideas of policy stability and change, policy change mechanisms might incorporate the idea that lobbying plays a socially ambivalent role in society. The chapter concludes scholars of policy making to go beyond the key players and even the networks of actors and consider nature of interactions within policy domains in order to understand how policy endures or changes.
