ABSTRACT
Before the Great War, Britain’s fundamental, unquestioned Middle East interest was the route to India and the Far East.2 Thus, from the 1830s, it protected a number of Arab countries along the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf; in 1882, it occupied Egypt (though Gladstone did not intend this to be long term), partly to protect the Suez Canal, and uphold the pro-western style of government threatened by Arabi Pasha. During the war, the route required protection; then, as the Ottoman Empire disintegrated, a new system of allegiances needed building. So, agreements were made with Arab rulers, who became British clients and allies against Turkey. The most prominent agreement was that concluded by the Hussein-McMahon correspondence of 1915, whereby Britain linked itself to the Hashemite family. The extent to which this promised self-determination for all Arabs is still debated, but after the war some Arabs felt betrayed by Britain. Britain also thought about the role of other powers in the post-war Middle East, particularly France. In May 1916, the Sykes-Picot agreement foresaw an independent Arab confederation, with Britain ‘influencing’ the south around the Persian Gulf, and France the north, including Mosul; provisions were included for an area of French direct rule, on the Syrian coast, while Britain took the Mediterranean ports of Haifa and Acre. This was
complicated by the 1917 Balfour Declaration, which supported the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. Many Arabs argued that Sykes-Picot and the Balfour Declaration contradicted promises given to Hussein.
