ABSTRACT
The chapter examines tathat-üa and the asaṃskṛta-dharmas more fully. It explores several examples of arguments in which, should the Yogacarins have wished to offer an idealist argument about metaphysical foundations or causation, they could have, but they didn't. It also explores exactly what sort of account of causal dependence the Ch 'eng wei-shih lun gives. At first glance there seems to be a clear difference between the Yogaacaaric notion derived from the Madhyaanta-vibhaaga and the Maadhyamikan notion expressed by Candrakairti. While Candrakairti says that neither being nor non-being may be predicated of 'individuals', Yogaacaara seems to be saying that emptiness can be predicated of some things, and non-emptiness can be predicated of other things. Candrakairti's statement thus has universal application, whereas the Yogaacaara position divides that which can be predicated into two distinct classes. Thus the section of the Ch'eng wei-shih lun that discusses in the chapter indeed is one that is culled from or heavily indebted to Dharmapala's writings.
