ABSTRACT
The Shah's desire to play the role of a regional leader was not new, but had previously been viewed with scepticism by the United States. His domestic power base considered too shaky to permit such a role. The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations had all told the Shah to devote his attention to his internal political problems rather than to foreign and military affairs. The original inspiration of the Nixon Doctrine had nothing to do with security issues in the Gulf, it was soon evident that this region become the first, and as it turned out, the serious, test of America's new geopolitical mood. The Iran-Arab divide was based upon ancient and deep-rooted ethnic, cultural, national, and sectarian factors; but matters were not helped by the Shah's occasional heavy-handedness. Nixon's 1972 decision on arms sales to Iran was not preceded by any systematic inter-agency consideration, but its net effect was to exempt future Iranian requests from the normal review process.
