ABSTRACT
The year 1979 was a watershed for US position and policy in the Persian Gulf region. The year brought in a series of upheavals, beginning with the overthrow of the Shah in Iran and ending with a massive Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The political and strategic consequences of the revolution equally negative for the US the Khomeini regime's intense antagonism towards the US frustrated the Carter administration policy of damage limitation in Iran. Iran's clergy viewed this campaign as a potent instrument in its efforts to prevail over the disparate ideological factions challenging the clergy's domination of the post-revolutionary polity. The presence of a large number of Shi'a Muslims within the population of the Arab Gulf States, especially in Bahrain and Iraq, helped the Iranian drive. The 'defensive' view further held that the implications of the advent of a non-communist regime in Kabul for the security of its southern borders needed to be added to the list of Soviet apprehensions.
