ABSTRACT
In the literature of social theory and sociology, in contrast, the terms are sharply distinguished, at least in theoretically sensitive contexts. Emile Durkheim made a point of criticizing his rival Gabriel Tarde for replacing the expression 'collective psychology' by 'interpsychology'. The first expression appeared to him to be tainted with ontology, because it seems to imply that there is a collective psychology proper. Transcendental arguments is that 'collective tacit knowledge', 'collective intentionality', and so forth are the condition for the possibility of outcomes that Harry Collins and similar users of these arguments believe cannot be explained in any other way. The neo-Kantians radicalized this argument by applying it not only to the certain knowledge of the physical world supplied by physics, but to a whole range of domains of thought in which objective knowledge was possible. The larger problem here is about the distinction between 'epistemic' and 'psychological' inherited from Kant.
