Idealism As A Theory Of Reality

The nature of idealism even in European thought is so indefinite that we can hardly get a fixed notion of it from the writings of the idealists themselves. It is generally thought to be opposed to realism, but is often put as an antithesis to naturalism and sometimes to actualism. Again, the empirical tendency is often regarded as antagonistic to idealism, but the latter crept into empirical philosophy as well, so that the tendency opposed to empiricism is designated rationalism and not idealism. Idealism thus seems to be positively related to both empiricism and rationalism; and it is interesting to note that empiricism, which started with the presupposition that the objects experienced are real and are there, ¹ comes to the conclusion that they are not real but are our ideas. ² But when cornered again, empiricism treats these ideas not as ours but as God’s; ³ and thus the objects regain their reality for us. This passing and repassing of idealism and realism into each other do not allow us to treat them as fixed theories with clear demarcations. Consequently, it seems that, for a philosophy which is comprehensive, to be called either realism or idealism is in principle precluded, if the antagonism between the two is to be retained. Sometimes, a scientist would call any speculation that leads him a little beyond where he is prepared to go idealism; so that any attempt at metaphysics is dubbed idealism. In the history of European philosophy, idealism assumed various forms which often appear to be conflicting and contradictory; and therefore if one of them is called idealism, the rest may have to be treated as opposed to idealism. In contemporary philosophy, idealism claims as its followers quite rival philosophers. In view of these difficulties, some like Professor John Mackenzie declare that idealism is rather a tendency than a fixed theory.