Table 9.1 Percentage of British national income gained in 1913 8, Elasticity of non-British demand for manufactures with respect to non-British supply 00-10-50-71-0 y> 1 19 16 7-64-41-0 Elasticity 2 13 11 5-23-00-1 of supply 39-58-23-92-30-5 of British 47-86-53-11-80-4 manufactures 56-45*62-71-50-3 the same: the gain of income from deindustrializing the rest of the world in 1913 would have been remarkably small. The limitations on the result are clear enough that there is no need to examine them in detail on this occasion. The model is a partial equilibrium one; Britain's gain in the alternative world from cheaper imports of agricultural goods, as well as her loss from more expensive manufactured imports and cheaper coal exports, is suppressed; the estimates of the elasticities could be much improved; and redistributive and transitional effects are ignored. Nonetheless, the exercise points to an important moral, namely, that the attention lavished on the trade sector and especially on foreign competition in that sector as a 'deter-minant' of British income does not appear to be warranted by the facts. The late nineteenth century was the time of the greatest development of the international economy, with Britain - the world's banker, the world's shipper and, less than before, the world's manufacturer - at its center. The inference that Britain was therefore dependent on even substantial changes in the character of the international economy, however, is doubtful. If the argument made here is even approximately true, another view is more tenable: if we must use metaphors, Britain's income 'depended' not on the great changes in the international economy of the late nineteenth century, but on the pace of technological change and enterprise at home.

DOI link for Table 9.1 Percentage of British national income gained in 1913 8, Elasticity of non-British demand for manufactures with respect to non-British supply 00-10-50-71-0 y> 1 19 16 7-64-41-0 Elasticity 2 13 11 5-23-00-1 of supply 39-58-23-92-30-5 of British 47-86-53-11-80-4 manufactures 56-45*62-71-50-3 the same: the gain of income from deindustrializing the rest of the world in 1913 would have been remarkably small. The limitations on the result are clear enough that there is no need to examine them in detail on this occasion. The model is a partial equilibrium one; Britain's gain in the alternative world from cheaper imports of agricultural goods, as well as her loss from more expensive manufactured imports and cheaper coal exports, is suppressed; the estimates of the elasticities could be much improved; and redistributive and transitional effects are ignored. Nonetheless, the exercise points to an important moral, namely, that the attention lavished on the trade sector and especially on foreign competition in that sector as a 'deter-minant' of British income does not appear to be warranted by the facts. The late nineteenth century was the time of the greatest development of the international economy, with Britain - the world's banker, the world's shipper and, less than before, the world's manufacturer - at its center. The inference that Britain was therefore dependent on even substantial changes in the character of the international economy, however, is doubtful. If the argument made here is even approximately true, another view is more tenable: if we must use metaphors, Britain's income 'depended' not on the great changes in the international economy of the late nineteenth century, but on the pace of technological change and enterprise at home.

Table 9.1 Percentage of British national income gained in 1913 8, Elasticity of non-British demand for manufactures with respect to non-British supply 00-10-50-71-0 y> 1 19 16 7-64-41-0 Elasticity 2 13 11 5-23-00-1 of supply 39-58-23-92-30-5 of British 47-86-53-11-80-4 manufactures 56-45*62-71-50-3 the same: the gain of income from deindustrializing the rest of the world in 1913 would have been remarkably small. The limitations on the result are clear enough that there is no need to examine them in detail on this occasion. The model is a partial equilibrium one; Britain's gain in the alternative world from cheaper imports of agricultural goods, as well as her loss from more expensive manufactured imports and cheaper coal exports, is suppressed; the estimates of the elasticities could be much improved; and redistributive and transitional effects are ignored. Nonetheless, the exercise points to an important moral, namely, that the attention lavished on the trade sector and especially on foreign competition in that sector as a 'deter-minant' of British income does not appear to be warranted by the facts. The late nineteenth century was the time of the greatest development of the international economy, with Britain - the world's banker, the world's shipper and, less than before, the world's manufacturer - at its center. The inference that Britain was therefore dependent on even substantial changes in the character of the international economy, however, is doubtful. If the argument made here is even approximately true, another view is more tenable: if we must use metaphors, Britain's income 'depended' not on the great changes in the international economy of the late nineteenth century, but on the pace of technological change and enterprise at home.