Radical scepticism is meant to serve a methodological function. The goal is to show that one's theory of knowledge is scepticism-proof, since if it there must be something seriously wrong with the view. Some plausible claims about our knowledge can thus be used to generate a valid argument which produces this rather devastating radically sceptical conclusion. In this sense, the sceptical argument is a paradox, and thus a counter-intuitive conclusion. A very different sort of response to the argument might be to try to use the closure principle to undergraduates’ own anti-sceptical advantage. Given the plausibility of the sceptical premise regarding philosophers’ inability to know the denials of sceptical hypotheses, the current state of play seems to be less a victory to Mooreanism as merely a further problem for one's theory of knowledge that needs to be resolved. One final anti-sceptical theory that we will look at is contextualism.