ABSTRACT

Two of the psychological concepts Wittgenstein identified as being widely ramified are those of thought and intention. Accordingly, different kinds of use of the words ‘think’ and ‘intend’ can be distinguished, and it would be possible to mark these different kinds of use by the employment of different words:

Remember that our language might possess a variety of different words: one for ‘thinking out loud’; one for thinking as one talks to oneself in the imagination; one for a pause during which something or other floats before the mind, after which, however, we are able to give a confident answer.

One word for a thought expressed in a sentence; one for a lightning thought which I may later ‘clothe in words’; one for wordless thinking as one works. 1

There might be a verb which meant: to formulate an intention in words or other signs, out loud or in one’s thoughts. This word would not mean the same as our ‘intend’.

There might be a verb which meant: to act according to an intention; and neither would this word mean the same as our ‘intend’.

Yet another might mean: to brood over an intention; or to turn it over and over in one’s head. 2