ABSTRACT
In this second stabilisation chapter, I chart the demise of the high idealism of the UK’s stabilisation narrative for Afghanistan. Upon the entry of British forces into Helmand Province in April 2006, the assumptions underpinning the democratisation and reconstruction elements of Labour’s stabilisation policy came into contact with the harsh realities of southern Afghanistan for the first time. This chapter argues that the weight of events in Helmand rapidly undermined the Blair Government’s ‘Comprehensive Approach’ and resulted in a gradual yet unmistakeable reduction of stabilisation aims in the narrative, ultimately resulting in a revised, national security-centric narrative from late 2008 onwards. This trend may be understood as the result of the implementation of SC processes as a means of overcoming substantial intra-state tensions regarding the purpose of the Helmand mission, which were in turn the result of Government attempting to meet its transnational obligations to the United States and NATO.
