ABSTRACT
The final example of signalling sanctions involves the measures imposed by the EU on China after the 1989 events of Tiananmen Square. After the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, the European Council issued a declaration calling for the member states of the European Community to halt the sale of weapons to China, and although never made legally binding after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the embargo had been received by national legislation and it is considered politically binding up to the present. Over twenty years since the events that determined its imposition, the apparent lack of direct material impact and the meagre improvements in China’s human rights record China may suggest that either the sanctions should be made stricter in order to have a direct material impact and affect the decisions of the leadership in Beijing, or they should be lifted because they have clearly been unsuccessful in changing the behaviour of the target. Indeed, China has not made any concessions in political terms, has not held any inquiries into the events of Tiananmen Square, and has not freed the individuals who were arrested and sentenced for the 1989 demonstrations (Edmonds 2002, Hellstrom 2010, Kerr and Fei 2007, Kreutz 2005, Tang 2005, Stumbaum 2012).
