ABSTRACT
As previously argued, it appears that if there is a somatic death of the original body and the assumption of a new body, then personhood requires some plausible grounding for persistence. While it may be true that all the positions on origins outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 have the modal possibility of a surviving soul in virtue of the independent and distinct soul as substance, each view (barring creationist views) seems to have entailments given its view on origins that make affirming persistence a difficulty. If the particular view requires an arbitrary or ad-hoc solution to the problem of persistence, and one has a position that is naturally more satisfying, then one has reason to affirm the latter position instead of the former. I argue below that two positions, namely traducianism and ESDMO, will struggle to provide a plausible solution to this problem of the persisting soul in light of somatic death. This is not to deny that miracles are possible, but it may be unnatural given the position and its metaphysical entailments. Maximally, these positions run into an impossibility because even God cannot do the logically impossible. Minimally, these positions run into the probability of not being true because of the potentially divisible nature of the soul. The next criterion concerns the nature of the body as a significant part of
human personhood, albeit non-essential to the existence of personhood. Both common sense and Christian theology support the significance of the body, as I have shown already, such that one ought to affirm a view that is commensurate with this and coherently accounts for the reality and significance of the body. Yet, it is not uncommon for objectors to raise this problem for substance dualism. Materialist critic of substance dualism, Joel Green, has persuasively argued for the notion that human life is an embodied life. In the context of critiquing views that identify persons with souls, Joel Green states that ‘for Paul, embodied existence is the norm.’1 Yet, most substance dualists, especially Christian dualists, affirm the truth that human life and existence is typically an embodied life, so no problem there. The difficulty for the theologian is
providing an accounting for the proposition that souls are normally embodied, can persist during the interim period, and will likely exist again as embodied souls. An intimate and natural relationship between body and soul seems apparent in the pages of Scripture. A substance dualist position must support a robust relationship between the soul and body, and, support such a relationship that accounts for the significance of the body to the soul. Marc Cortez supports this by stating:
Nearly everyone affirms that human persons are physical, embodied beings and that this is an important feature of God’s intended design for human life. Thus, most biblical terms such as “spirit,” “soul,” “body,” “flesh,” and the like, appear at first glance to refer to “parts” of the human person, they actually should be understood as referring to the human person as a whole, albeit from different perspective.
