ABSTRACT
So far, the narrative has revealed such indicators of political instability as riots, a war of secession, military coups d’état, etc. that have plagued Nigeria ever since it was created through British colonial fiat. But apart from the 30-plus month long Biafra war of secession, which claimed more than a million lives, military coups d’état—successful, abortive and attempted—have been some of the strongest indicators of political instability in post-colonial Nigeria. Since January 15, 1966 when Nigeria experienced the first military coup d’état, there have been four successful coups d’état (on July 1966, in 1975, 1983, and 1985); one foiled attempt (1986) and three abortive attempts (on January 1966, in 1976, and 1990) respectively. A closer look at those military coups d’état is particularly necessary at this stage in the narrative for the principle reason that the vital demographic data—nationality, religious affiliation, etc.—that they reveal about their plotters and participants, and even their victims amplify echoes of loop-sided recruitment patterns in the military and their impacts. Indeed, Nigeria's military coups d’état encapsulate credible pointers that underscore arguments made in the discourse that the policy that guided the recruitment of indigenous men into military forces in colonial and early post-colonial Nigeria establish a legacy that spawns coups d’état in its body politic when colonial rule ended. However, for obvious reasons, vital demographic and other data are available only on plotters, participants, and victims of unsuccessful coups d’état. In and by itself, that deficiency makes it difficult to include Nigeria's successful military coups d’état in this close examination exercise.
