ABSTRACT
The proliferation pessimists base their assessments on organizational theory as it applies to nuclear crisis management and on the technical and procedural constraints related to the operation of nuclear forces. This chapter considers the assumptions made about realist international systems theory (RIST) and rational deterrence theory (RDT) in this debate and asks whether these assumptions are robust with regard to the issue of nuclear proliferation. Some theorists and policy makers now predict that the slow spread of nuclear weapons can be made compatible with future international peace and stability by mixing the same ingredients: realism and deterrence. The nuclear version of international realism has a number of intellectual and policy prescriptive weaknesses. The Cold War is, however, mixed evidence for the value of nuclear-deterrence as a guaranty pact for peace. Cold War experience, inter alia, shows how RIST and RDT offer valuable, but highly contingent, explanatory and predictive insights pertinent to world politics and foreign policy decision making.
