ABSTRACT
Ronald Dworkin's work has long focused on legitimating an active use of judicial review in order to forward a liberal constitutional narrative that would accommodate the previously excluded, to the end of fostering equal rights and tolerance for all. By regularly referencing the constituent elements of well-entrenched discourses, parody addresses Fish's fear that truly subversive narratives will literally not be recognized in well-defined genres such as contemporary constitutional discourse, or in two of its major sub-narratives, judicial restraint and judicial activism. Readers who are wedded to interpreting the Constitution as a comedy that legitimizes equitable and progressive outcomes or as a romance that longs to return to a more idyllic and enlightened past may remain unpersuaded that parody is the most useful strategy for their particular purposes. By contesting legitimacy, parody may provide an opportunity to achieve a better balance between consent and dissent than that which seems currently available in contemporary constitutional discourse.
