ABSTRACT
After a brief flurry of activity in late 1853 the Russians and Turks settled to winter on opposite banks of the Danube. Logistical problems, exacerbated by the season, made a Russian offensive impossible. The Czar anticipated crossing the river in April, raising the standard of Christian insurrection, as Paskevic had advised. Paskevic was now more cautious, favouring an attack on Silistria to secure Bulgarian assistance before moving on to Adrianople. Far inland these operations would render allied seapower irrelevant. In a purely Russo-Turkish war strategic issues would have remained paramount, but Austria had no desire to see Russia increase her control over the Danube, the principal artery of Habsburg trade. Further, raising nationalist insurrection among the Balkan peoples would cause serious problems for the multi-racial Habsburg Empire. Austria signalled these concerns by moving troops onto the Serbian frontier, which in turn made Paskevic nervous. In early February he advised holding a strategic reserve in Poland against Austria or Prussia and using Silistria to draw Turkish and allied forces deep inland, before crushing them. Initially Nicholas was more bellicose, but allied amphibious power led him to accept Paskevic’s plan by the end of the month.
