ABSTRACT
When news that Russia had accepted the Austrian Ultimatum reached Britain late on 16 January interest in practical strategy evaporated. The Baltic and Black Sea campaigns were drawn up in outline to support the diplomacy of peace. Cabinet acceptance of Louis Napoleon’s plans indicated the reduced significance of strategy. Allied diplomatic co-operation was now the key to success. Neither Palmerston nor the Court was pleased by this turn of events. Public opinion, at least as voiced by the newspapers, was firmly opposed to peace. All anticipated success in 1856, some recompense for the disappointments of the Redan and Kars. Palmerston observed:
if peace can now be concluded on conditions honourable and secure, it would, as Your Majesty justly observes, not be right to continue the war for the mere purpose of prospective victories. It will, however, be obviously necessary to continue active preparations up to the moment when a definitive Treaty of Peace is signed, in order that the Russians may not find it for their interest to break off negotiations when the season for operations shall approach.
These preparations were primarily for Cronstadt, although the reinforcement of the Crimea continued. 1 Yet all this was little more than an insurance of Russian good faith. The real issues were diplomatic. Diplomacy had replaced strategy as the process to secure war aims. The object remained the same: to prevent Russian expansion on her northern and southern frontiers.