ABSTRACT
Any assessment of British strategic planning in the period 1853–56 should emphasise that success in war is relative. The basic question must be how far British strategy achieved the war aims set out by the politicians. War aims, like strategic plans, do not long survive the first contact of armies; they are modified by the passage of time, the level of commitment and an acceptance of what is possible. British war aims were never fixed beyond the ‘Four Points’, and always subject to powerful external influences and the limitations inherent in the British position. These points can be summarised in descending order.
The French Alliance, which as a partnership of approximate equals had to act by co-operation. This was not always achieved, because of the weakness of the British army. After January 1855 Britain had to accept French direction of the war, and this was most evident in the concentration of forces in the Crimea. France and Britain had different aims in making war on Russia, and in times of stress these became evident in strategic decision making.
The lack of trained manpower. Throughout the war the British army was far short of the voted war establishment. The first impact of this could be seen in the planned operations in Turkey and the grand raid on Sevastopol. The British needed an operation where limited forces could achieve the greatest impact. When the coup de main against Sevastopol turned into a battle of attrition, this weakness gave the French the dominant voice. It also led to attempts to raise mercenary forces, which alienated the United States and some German states. Without some form of conscription this weakness was inevitable, given the small peacetime force.
Reluctance to use coercion also affected naval recruitment. There were never more than 56,000 men afloat, against 140–150,000 at the height of the war against Napoleon. Allied to the shortage of steam warships for the principal theatres, this prevented the execution of a more rigorous maritime strategy. It also indicated the limited British commitment; the old recruiting measures of impressment and a bounty were available and relatively inexpensive, but neither was raised in cabinet, let alone in the House of Commons.
Austrian neutrality. The central position of Austria as a Balkan power and the effective leader of the German states allowed her to limit the conflict to Russia’s maritime flanks. While the allies wanted her support they were careful not to alienate her by pressing Turkish claims, or more fundamentally by adopting a war aims programme that posited any profound alteration in the European order. In the event the impact of the war on Russia did have a major impact on the European balance. Within a decade Austria had been defeated by France and lost the leadership of Germany to Prussia, the real beneficiary of the war.
Political weakness. The inability of Palmerston to create a cabinet consensus higher than the ‘Four Points’, allied to the weak parliamentary base of his administration, precluded the adoption of a more ambitious war aims programme. Strategy was bent to wider aims, but only in certain areas – primarily those where maritime rather than purely military operations were required.
Outside the war the United States, Persia and India posed serious threats to British interests. They had to be countered: India by retaining scarce troops, Persia by war and the United States by armed diplomacy. All three used up human and material resources.
Had the grand raid at Sevastopol been successful many of these problems could have been reduced, but not avoided. The fundamental error came when the allies adopted a war aims programme based on the ‘Four Points’ without appreciating what such terms would require of Russia. The allies wasted 18 months fighting a limited war only to discover Russia would not surrender her position on the Euxine unless she faced a more fundamental threat. Sweden would not join the allies until they made an unlimited effort. Austria was the first to realise that unlimited methods would have to be used to secure peace. The Austrian Ultimatum was an attempt to persuade the Czar to concede what he had already lost, before defeat in an unlimited struggle altered the European balance of power – something that would damage Austrian interests. When Palmerston realised that France was trying to engineer a limited peace he switched his efforts to the only unlimited operation open to Britain, the naval assault on Cronstadt/St Petersburg. If the alliance had been in better health a combined attack, as sketched by Canrobert, might have been adopted, but time and confidence in the French were lacking. Instead the Great Armament was cobbled up into half a decisive strategy. Austria’s latent threat, along with the enormous cumulative damage caused by two years of economic warfare and attrition in the Crimea, left Russia with no reserves to meet the new challenge. Swedish intentions, always uncertain, added further complications. This unlimited threat ended the war, secured the ‘Four Points’ and represented a major setback for Russian Baltic policy, despite the inherent weaknesses of the British position that precluded the adoption of any other method. Although the object of the war, even in Palmerston’s grandest permutations, was never more than to place some barrier in the path of Russian expansion, this could not be achieved by limited means. Russian acceptance of the Austrian Ultimatum reflected her inability to win the war and the effect of the war on the state, rather than any victories won by allied arms. When the future held only more defeats it was sound policy to give way, recover, rebuild and start again.