War Aims and Strategy

Although Graham’s policy was never placed before the cabinet in a coherent form he dominated the formation of British strategy in 1853–54. His views were promoted by private correspondence, so that when the question of strategy came before the cabinet his opinions had wide support and he did not have to put them forward himself. As a result his name appears suspiciously infrequently in the records of decision making. After Sinope he outlined the broad issues of war with Russia, demonstrating an understanding of the unity of the theatres and the central position of Sevastopol. The contributions of his cabinet colleagues were limited by inexperience and a failure to comprehend the scale of the task. Palmerston’s war aims programme looked to restrict Russian power, but his grasp of practical strategy was weak. The political aim of Graham’s policy was to keep Russia within the Turkish Straits, but for public purposes the maintenance of Turkey was the sine qua non of British policy. ¹ The two objects were not identical, as the later stages of the war demonstrated. Graham believed the destruction of Sevastopol would secure the Straits, but he also prepared for the defence of Constantinople. In early January he believed it would be possible to destroy Sevastopol by a naval assault; Dundas was not impressed and Graham abandoned the idea after reading Burgoyne’s paper on the possibilities of war with Russia, which pointed out the strength of Sevastopol against ships. A combined operation would be needed to take the city. Graham realised that a Russian advance through the Balkan mountains would force the fleets to leave the Euxine unless British troops occupied Gallipoli, as the French now refused to send any troops. Palmerston looked to Circassia and the Sea of Azov; Russell supported Graham in calling for troops to be held at Malta, and Newcastle planned for this eventuality. Clarendon wanted a plan to put before the Emperor, but Graham was preparing a cautious memorandum on the possibilities of war and discussing lines at Gallipoli to hold open the passage into the Black Sea with Burgoyne. Later he favoured a fortified camp at Adrianople, covering the Straits and the Ottoman capital, or a force at Varna to turn the Russian flank if they crossed the Danube. ² While Burgoyne believed even 40,000 British troops would not capture Sevastopol the operation remained central to Graham’s strategy:

My opinion from the beginning is in unison with the Emperor’s. The Dardanelles must be secured; a position in front of Constantinople fortified covering both the city and the Bosphorus; but the operation which will be ever memorable and decisive, is the capture and destruction of Sevastopol. On this my heart is set: the eye tooth of the Bear must be drawn: and ‘til his fleet and naval arsenal in the Black sea are destroyed there is no safety for Constantinople, no security for the peace of Europe.

His copy of the letter was marked ‘delenda est Sevastopol’. ³ Dundas wanted to start with the Circassian forts and called for more steam battleships. Sevastopol shifted in and out of the foreground of Graham’s policy as communicated to Dundas: on 5 February it was not possible in the immediate future; on the 22nd it returned to centre stage. There were no steam battleships available, the British were sending theirs to the Baltic, the French to the Black Sea. Once at war Dundas must take control of the sea and use an army to attack the Russian coast. ⁴ War broke out a week later without further development of Graham’s plans. Those plans relied on French troops, but when Cowley raised the possibility of attempting Sevastopol with Louis Napoleon in early January – following Graham’s suggestion that the combined operation sketched by Walker could be carried out by 25–30,000 French and 10–12,000 British troops – the Emperor refused, fearing the domestic impact of a defeat and proposed sending a few officers to assist the Turks. Cowley urged that Walker be sent to Paris; Graham, now looking to fortify Gallipoli, reluctantly agreed, and when the engineer officer sent to inspect the Dardanelles fell ill at Lisbon Burgoyne volunteered to replace him. Graham dispatched him through Paris to explain the need for troops and to take a French officer on his inspection. Arriving in Paris late on 29 January Burgoyne had several interviews over the two following days with the Emperor, Marshal Vaillant, Drouyn, Prince Jerome and Cowley. Vaillant, another veteran engineer, proposed a position 10–12 miles in front of Constantinople, to be held by 30,000 men, and sent Colonel Ardant. The Emperor prepared to send troops from Algeria. ⁵ Burgoyne left the War Office to settle the details. Newcastle anticipated sending 25,000 British troops under Lord Raglan, with 35–40,000 French; 12,000 would remain at Gallipoli. The selection of Raglan reflected the paucity of experienced commanders: there were no other men of his rank fit to take the field. ⁶ Raglan, Lord de Ros, the Quartermaster-General, and Walker were in Paris between 26 and 28 February. Walker carried the outline of Graham’s Black Sea and Baltic strategies. Raglan and Walker were unimpressed by the Emperor’s plans for an assault on Sevastopol, which he pressed on Cowley after they left. ⁷