Mali at War

The Mali War of 2012–2013 could be called the fourth Tuareg rebellion against the Malian state. Indeed, it started out like yet another secular-nationalist Tuareg rebellion. But it was soon overtaken by events, including the unexpected coup d’état in March of 2012, followed by the expulsion of the Tuareg rebels from Timbuktu and Gao by the jihadist-Salafist militias Ansar Dine and MUJAO. The seemingly sudden appearance of the Islamist militias effectively marginalized the Tuareg rebels just as they were consolidating their control of the newly captured northern regions. ¹ The extreme versions of contraband smuggling, human trafficking, and Islamic ideology that had been destabilizing the region (see Chapter 6) had morphed into total political and military collapse in the Malian Sahara. Mali’s north comprises three Régions: Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. The Tuareg and the Arabs represent a minority of the population of the north, and about 5 percent of the total population of Mali. ² The largest ethnic group of the north is the Songhai, who live mainly along the Niger River. According to Mali’s 2009 census, Tamasheq speakers account for about 32 percent of northern Mali’s population, but these would include many bellah, historically the servants of the Tuareg and Arabs. The World Factbook says that the Tuaregs and Arabs together comprise 10 percent of Mali’s total population of nearly 16,000,000. ³ Trouble with the Tuareg had been simmering since the last insurgency of 2006-2009, as warlord Ibrahim Bahanga raided army posts and took hostages for ransom, thus keeping the pot boiling. ⁴ This is to say nothing of the presence of AQIM terrorists in the Kidal Région since 2003. Besides the problem of the secular-nationalist insurgencies of the Tuareg and the jihadist-Salafist terrorism of AQIM, there also loomed the prospect of significant petroleum resources beneath the northern sands. The Saharan hydrocarbon sector has already proved transformative for Algeria and Libya. Some 95 percent of all exports from Algeria and Libya are crude oil or natural gas, accounting for 30 and 60 percent of the countries’ GDP respectively. Presumed deposits in Mali and Mauritania are still being explored. In Mali, explorations are ongoing in the Taoudenit basin in the far north and the Graben field near Gao. If these fields come in as hoped, Mali may become the latest prize in what Baz Lecocq calls a “new scramble for Africa.” ⁵ For now, however, there are few alternative sources of income in the Malian Sahara besides smuggling, whether the cargo be Algerian foodstuffs or South American narcotics. ⁶