Intervention and Restoration

Despite impatience on the part of the Malian people and the international community, the hoped-for invasion of the north was delayed by at least three factors. First, the Malian army was in terrible shape, hollowed out by corruption under the democratically elected administrations and weakened by infighting since the 2012 coup. Second, ECOWAS troops were not yet trained for desert warfare and were not properly equipped. Third, a detailed invasion plan was not yet in place. ¹ An additional problem was that ECOWAS and the Malian transitional government were not on the same page in terms of goals and objectives, and in terms of vision for a post-war West Africa. Blaise Compaoré, president of Burkina, was the head of the ECOWAS mediation team. Under Compaoré’s leadership, the team had entered talks with the MNLA and Ansar Dine after the two rebel groups promised Compaoré they would support the Malian army against MUJAO and AQIM. But most Malians were still bitter towards the MNLA, believing it was their fighters who had started the rebellion in the first place. ² Algeria had also entered into talks with the leadership of Ansar Dine, pushing it to break its ties with AQIM. By the end of 2012, Ansar Dine was based in Kidal, having abandoned Timbuktu to MUJAO. Kidal is the only Région of Mali with a Tuareg majority, and its mountainous redoubts were considered likely places for resistance to any invasion force seeking to retake the north from the rebels. Kidal is dominated by the Kel Adagh, or the Ifoghas lineage. The amenokal of the Kel Adagh is Intallah ag Attaher. Intallah’s son Alghabass ag Intallah had been MNLA, then he became the second in command of Ansar Dine. By late 2012, Alghabass had formed the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA), effectively dropping the word “Liberation” from the name. Both the MIA and the MNLA were in discussions with ECOWAS. By January 3, the MNLA was openly seeking an alliance with the French against what was left of the Islamists, though such an alliance would have been unacceptable to the Malian army, which was not yet ready to forgive the MNLA. ³