ABSTRACT
Introduction If my argument in chapter 1 was successful, then Socrates is optimistic that a critical and self-critical investigation of traditional values that is inspired by traditional values can make substantial progress toward the truth. Skepticism regarding traditional answers to fundamental questions about virtue is, in Socrates’ view, validated by traditional values and is a suitable starting point for serious inquiry. But if no human can achieve divine wisdom, and if human wisdom is worthless in comparison, they why bother? A first step in answering this question was taken in chapter 2: Socrates’ skepticism is not Cartesian, stripping away all beliefs for which we cannot provide rock-solid support; rather Socrates’ skepticism consists in urging us to seek greater epistemic maturity with respect to our important beliefs about virtue, using our pre-reflective and epistemically immature convictions as starting points. The Prometheus myth is a perfect analogy: although we are forever denied divine foresight, we can interpret signs of the future (Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound 476-506). As is suitable for a mystagogue, Socrates does not import any sophisticated epistemological apparatus, but instead relies on quite common folk practices, for example the hermeneutic ascent and putting proposals to the test.
