ABSTRACT
Ironically, although few documents concerning French-Israeli nuclear cooperation have been made public, this aspect of French-Israeli relations attracts the most attention.1 There are good reasons for this. First, considering the ties between the two countries, the area beset with the most serious implications was without doubt Israel’s quest for nuclear capability. Second, and almost without precedence in international relations, this cooperation provides explicit proof of the special relationship that existed between France and Israel at the time; thus it is only natural that it should attract scholarly attention. Finally, the subject is all the more intriguing due to the shrouds of secrecy and mystery that surround it. All studies concerning this issue note that de Gaulle’s rise to power signied a turning point in France’s nuclear aid to Israel. However this change did not begin immediately. Indeed, Israel received the most signicant elements of French nuclear aid during the rst years of de Gaulle’s presidency. Most scholars agree that de Gaulle did not look favourably on nuclear cooperation between the two countries and wished to minimise it, yet few have commented on the motivations behind this desire. The general answers to this question offered by scholars lack an empirical basis. Academic literature provides three main explanations for the French decision to withdraw nuclear aid to Israel:
The rst of these concerns de Gaulle’s beliefs regarding the international system (Pean 1982, 126-27). He believed that states in general – and great powers in particular – should maintain a degree of independence and not become too closely allied with other nations. Accordingly, in his opinion, France should not share certain “reserved domains” with other nations, no matter how friendly their relations: chief among these was nuclear capability, which de Gaulle saw as the main symbol and expression of great power. This rationale for the termination of France’s nuclear support of Israel was shared by the French Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville,2 and also ts with the French President’s general views and his policy of maintaining French independence vis a vis the US and European institutions (especially EURATOM). However, due to its general nature, it is impossible to test the validity of this argument in any conclusive manner. Likewise, it also suffers from various aws, which while not altogether refuting it, weaken the claim. First, the military leaderships of the two countries continued their
close collaboration, even intensifying their cooperation beyond that of the previous era. The two armies maintained an exchange of secret information and prepared military plans for France to come to Israel’s assistance in the event of an Arab attack. De Gaulle regarded the ties between the countries as extraordinary – similar to his views on nuclear cooperation – but nevertheless allowed them to continue. Second, although de Gaulle issued explicit orders to halt French nuclear assistance to Israel, it was almost two years before these instructions were implemented. There is some evidence that he was not entirely ignorant of this state of affairs (see below), raising the question of how this can be reconciled with his basic objection to all nuclear cooperation. Third, during this period France desperately sought nuclear aid, principally from the US, not hesitating to ask for it openly and therefore was not adverse to nuclear cooperation with another state, at least when it suited de Gaulle’s interests.
