ABSTRACT
Accommodation and collusion reflects the fact that all regulatory agencies possess inadequate resources to pursue policies of full enforcement. An inevitable consequence of their selection of priorities is that much illegal trading and regulation-avoidance occurs without any regulatory response. Regulatory agencies, restricted by their powers of enforcement, accommodate a certain level of corporate bribery either through their inability to do otherwise or as a result of their decisions to prioritise or focus on other issues. Accommodation occurs not only due to practical limitations but also in respect of political and economic ideologies. Notable structural, legal, procedural, evidential and financial obstacles underpinned by varying levels of political influence are encountered by responsible authorities aiming to regulate transnational corporate bribery. In short, national authorities are pressured to respond to transnational corporate bribery using inter-national frameworks for enforcement but in doing so face significant difficulties in controlling complexly organised transnational, multi-jurisdictional corporate bribery.
