ABSTRACT
This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the key concepts discussed in the preceding chapters of this book. The fact-based evidences and analyses reported in the book, in addition to the industry expert's and thought leader's contribution. The book explains the 2007-2009 financial crisis had multiple triggering factors that evolved over the years. It also explains triggering factors of the financial crisis are excessive confidence in the risk distribution process through the Originate-To-Distribute (OTD) securitization process and 'pseudo-credit insurance protection' with the credit default swaps. The book provides plenty of evidences supporting the hypothesis of a major failure of the risk management departments of many financial institutions as a significant driver of the subprime mortgage loans crisis. It analyses report that a major failure did occur in financial firm's risk management, audit, internal controls, and corporate governance which have led to the financial crisis. The book provides the hypothesis a number of improvements have been introduced with the Dodd-Frank Act.
