ABSTRACT
In tax-based states, a ruler's political and military power largely depends on the amount of revenue he is able to extract from the population. One of the main considerations that limit the rulers' tendency to maximize tax revenues is the fear of alienating their powerful subjects, that is those who support their regime. When their rule seems less secure, rulers will make fiscal concessions to the powerful in order to maintain power. The author takes this theoretical construction and sees to what extent it can be applied to Byzantine reality, in particular to the reign of Andronikos II Palaiologos from 1282 to 1321. The long reign of Andronikos is commonly described as catastrophic in political terms as it was during this time that Asia Minor was lost to the Turks. Andronikos' reign was also a period of financial crisis. The emperor was often short of funds which forced him to take measures, of greater tax demands on his subjects.
