ABSTRACT
This chapter outlines the impact of the peace and political processes' internationalisation through an examination of its 'high politics', albeit broadly construed. It examines the Sunningdale and Anglo-Irish Agreements through the lens of 'high politics' casts doubt upon Lijphart's analysis of the former's failure, and O'Leary's interpretation of the intent of the latter's framers. In terms of Sunningdale, a 'high politics' analysis demonstrates British officials' failure to accurately interpret the divisions within unionism. In addition to providing a lifeline for the republicans, electoral politics also provided a good deal of justification for the republican movement's decision to curtail its armed campaign over the course of the peace process. Similarly, a 'high politics' examination of the Sunningdale Agreement and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) renders a unified interpretation of its framer's intent difficult. Therefore, any account of post-Agreement politics which did not give due weight to the roles of special advisers and civil servants would suffer from serious defects.
