ABSTRACT
It has been nearly four decades since Heinz Duchhardt highlighted some key precepts upon which the negotiations and peace accords of Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden following the War of Spanish Succession were based. In his view, the idea of a European balance of power guided the proceedings and precluded any nation from establishing supremacy over the others. Following Werner Hahlweg, Duchhardt emphasised that the maintenance of the territorial status quo in Europe was closely connected with the search for means to guarantee the continued existence of each state, even territorial means. With this endeavour in mind, fencing in France by creating barrières , or buffer zones with or without fortresses and garrisons, was the most pressing concern for France’s neighbouring countries. 2 Thus it was that the South-western Circles of the Holy Roman Empire had zealously – but ultimately fruitlessly – lobbied for the return of Alsace and portions of the dioceses Metz, Toul and Verdun, alongside the creation of a barrier stretching from Switzerland to the Moselle and Saar rivers. 3 For Savoy, the creation of a territorial buffer against France with several strategic fortresses, which would provide the duchy with a more defensible western border along the Alps, was a major sticking point during the negotiations. 4 However, the best-known example remains the Dutch barrier in the Southern Netherlands that was established in the aftermath of the Peace of Utrecht. This peace treaty gave sovereignty over the region to Emperor Charles VI, at least in principle. It was the Barrier Treaty of November 15, 1715 that prescribed the actual conditions under which the transfer of power would occur; making these agreements two sides of the same coin.
