ABSTRACT

The fact that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was not renewed when its originally stipulated 15 years expired in December 2008 exposed two conditions holding North American integration hostage: the first is the relationship between regional economic integration, immigration, and the state of the economy; and the second is the inherently nationalistic preferences over collective action in each of the three countries. Both can be squeezed for more theoretical light. Economic demand-supply explanations of one kind or another have influenced the literature on Mexican emigration, emphasizing how hopes of better living standards drive many from below the margin northwards (a per capita income of $33,900 in the United States versus $5,780 in Mexico at the start of the 21st Century), 1 and the availabilities of low-wage Mexican workers entice US producers (in both farms and factories) to recruit immigrants over their possible US counterparts. Yet, how US immigration policies also contribute to this flow has not attracted as much attention, motivating my argument: In implementing their immigration policies, US decision-makers unwittingly opened the door to more Mexican immigrants, both legal and illegal. Extant paradigms cannot, and immigration-related rhetoric will not, satisfactorily explain this. To understand the theoretical argument, attention must first rivet on empirical dynamics–first how the problem has festered, then on the big policy-making picture at the national (federal) level, and finally on how this differs from the smaller, but noisier local-level imprints. The article subsequently draws conclusions and projects implications.