ABSTRACT
From the analysis of the power-sharing agreements since the 1860s, and their negotiation and implementation, it is clear that the relationship between endogenous and exogenous factors have been the determining factors in consociational success and failure in Lebanon. Although elite cooperation was important for conflict regulation, power-sharing had been unsuccessful without constructive external pressure. After the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, and especially after the assassination of Rafik al-Hariri, the Lebanese were deeply divided between the 8 and 14 March camps. The Lebanese consociation that was negotiated in Tai’f in 1989 lost its interconfessional equilibrium and potential to regulate conflict because almost three decades of Syrian tutelage eroded democratic practice and interpretation of the accord. Syria interpreted consociation primarily for its own interests (the undemocratic Troika, for example), as opposed to those of the Lebanese communities. Once Syrian hegemony was institutionalized by the Syrian-Lebanese agreements, Syria ignored the Tai’f and violated its rules. It controlled Lebanon by backing and promoting its supporters in the various branches and departments of government, including the LAF. The Lebanese communities remained divided and the Lebanese-Syrian security regime benefited from the spoils of the system. During the era of Syrian tutelage Lebanon was kept stable, but after the Syrian withdrawal Lebanon experienced instability and institutional paralysis. In 2008, external constructive intervention enabled the Lebanese to elect a new president and form a national unity government. Therefore, we can say that, for power-sharing to be successful in regulating conflict over the long term in societies that are divided on sectarian and religious lines, external actors must have an interest in regulating the conflict and maintaining stability.
