ABSTRACT
The study of coalition has traditionally focused on three main questions: ‘Will it last?’ as well as ‘Who gets in?’ and ‘Who gets what?’ (Laver and Schofield 1990). More technically, the key concerns relate to the composition of the coalition, portfolio allocation and the stability and conflict management in the coalition once it has been formed. The German general election of 22 September 2013 led to the formation of the third cabinet under Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel and, after 2005–9, the second ‘grand coalition’ headed by her. This coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD) reflected the preferences of many German voters surveyed immediately before the election (Hilmer and Merz 2014), although the coalition was not the preferred option for either of the two parties. The coalition formed in November 2013 was intensely disputed within the SPD, highlighting the importance of the intra-party dimension of coalition bargaining. And the CDU/CSU could have secured more portfolios and, most likely, more policy influence in a coalition with the Greens. So, why did this coalition form despite the reservations on both sides?
