ABSTRACT
The conflict in Somalia was born out of a mixture of tensions of oxymoronic identity dualities deeply rooted in the history of the country: common ethnicity versus powerful clan-based cleavages; self-determination of identity groups versus their strong urge for integrity of statehood; history of colonial and postcolonial multiple interests versus present international indifference. Somalia was one of the first tests of post-Cold War institutional multilateralism joint interventions of states under the aegis of intergovernmental organization in domestic affairs of a conflict-torn country. The Security Council, under pressure from US administration and several other member-states, who wanted to score a success in Somalia and who argued for immediate and forceful intervention with the purpose of alleviation of human suffering, led UN into another stage: active involvement in peace-building. The causes of success of UNOSOM I and failure of UNOSOM II can be divided into two sets of factor inherent to the conflict environment and subjective for the intervener.
