ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the British government's intra-departmental debates and preparation of the so-called Saint Malo process. It argues that the actors within the UK core executive, including the Prime Minister Tony Blair, took the decisions to 'Europeanize' British defence policy because they believed it provided the best option for strengthening NATO. The chapter focuses on the work of Charles Lindblom to illuminate the processes behind British defence policy formulation and argues that the Europeanization of this policy sector conforms closely to Lindblom's 'successive limited comparisons' framework. An examination of the informal conference at Pörtschach, which was effectively the public introduction to the Saint Malo Accords, adds some important context to Blair's public announcement. In terms of bureaucratic processes, the chapter highlights the extent to which the domestic formulation of the Saint Malo process is similar to the 'success limited comparisons' model and therefore shows up a weakness in the liberal intergovernmental model.
