Conclusion

My purpose in this work has been to examine Griffin’s process theodicy, to see whether his process theism provides a more satisfactory solution to the problem of evil than that of traditional theism, specifically the traditional free-will theism. I have evaluated and replied to Griffin’s two contentions: (1) process theism provides a philosophically and theologically satisfactory solution to the problem of evil whereas (2) traditional theism fails to do so. In determining the satisfactoriness of responses to the problem of evil, the key question to keep in mind has been: Do traditional theism and process theism meet the test of the three criteria of philosophically and theologically satisfactory solutions to the problem of evil which Griffin himself advocates? Do each meet the criteria of (1) rational consistency, (2) adequacy to and illumination of the facts of our experience, and (3) adequacy to the generic idea of God in our tradition, particularly that of divine omnipotence? ¹