ABSTRACT
What are we to make of Griffin’s call to delimit the concept of divine omnipotence? Is the traditional view of divine omnipotence really metaphysically incoherent? In the previous chapter, I discussed why Griffin thinks that this is the case. In the present chapter, I want to respond to Griffin’s call for delimitation of God’s power. I shall do so by discussing whether the traditional theistic view of divine omnipotence really does imply that God can unilaterally bring about a logically possible state of affairs involving a multiplicity of beings (Premise Q), whether this view is metaphysically incoherent in view of what it means to be an actual being, and whether it makes sense to think that an actual being could coerce or be coerced. I shall end the chapter by considering whether the process view of a God who possesses only persuasive power is superior to the traditional view of a God who possesses coercive power.
