ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the attention to the 'justice' question, seeking to identify a set of evaluative criteria to use to determine whether the distributions of benefits and burdens made in institutional responses to wrongdoing are just. Confining the analysis to this particular moral terrain permits a clearer picture of justice's distinctiveness to emerge. Aristotle first expanded the notion of justice beyond this idea of a purely individual moral attribute. Imbuing entitlement with the status of the core concern of justice can often obscure rather than reveal its full distinctive moral terrain. Rawls's theorizing of justice places the notion of 'distribution' as central to the conceptual meaning of justice. Nozick's view is that any ordered or 'patterned' distributions, no matter what it is based upon, will always involve violations of rights. 'Domination' refers to the structural exclusion of people from any authentic role in deciding how to conduct their own lives.
