ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that the armed contractor phenomenon is a form of commodification, and it is this commodification of force that is distinct from and detrimental to a state's monopoly of force. It introduces Radin's conception of contested commodification. The chapter discusses the commodification of force, by focusing on two commonly held consequentialist arguments against commodification of force. By discussing the benefits and costs of employing private security companies (PSCs), it demonstrates that normally the hiring of PSCs is consequentially unsound. The argument against the commodification of force, manifested through the hiring of PSCs, negatively impacts Weber's monopoly of force. More precisely, the overall negative consequence of hiring PSCs should preclude their use unless in extreme emergencies. The chapter discusses the issues of control and security privatization, focusing on the problems that arise in the practice of subcontracting, the introduction of multiple and transnational stakeholders into the force commodification equation.
