ABSTRACT
As the discourse turns to spatial arrangements within Romania it is appropriate first to recall previous comments on the regional system that places groups of counties into eight large regions appropriate for EU accession (Table 10.1). While the counties still comprise the highest level of local government, the regions now enjoy a degree of autonomy in planning their respective areas despite the importance of finance and direction from the centre combined with the influence of the relevant CCs and municipalities. Hence the individual regional plans have their distinct characteristics apart from their harmonisation with the various ‘axes’ of the national plan (concerned with job creation, regional development, agriculture, transport and environment quality) that tackle the twin challenges of growth and poverty alleviation. Thus the plan for the relatively poor North East region drew attention to the many aspects of deprivation that the planners needed to address (ANDR 2000a) while its success over SAPARD funding – €1.63bln in 2006: three times the regional average – suggests there is no shortage of enterprise. At the same time the prime importance of the county unit tends to weaken regional development and there is some criticism over lack of cohesion which inhibits a regional centre like Timişoara in the West Region from acting as a conduit passing growth projects down the hierarchy to areas of high unemployment like the Jiu Valley coalfield and the industrial towns of Caraş-Severin (the county centre of Reşiţa and smaller towns like Anina, Bocşa and Moldova Nouă). But various national strategies have been launched from the centre; beginning during the 1990-96 period with ad hoc regional programmes: first for the Carpathians as a whole and later for a specific mountain region (the Apuseni) and lowland areas including the Danube delta and parts of Moldavia. There were also incentives for ‘free zones’ involving ports and other places important for transit. Then the centre-right government of 19972000 introduced the regions and accelerated restructuring through ‘less-favoured areas’ for the mining zones (from 1998) (Borcoş & Vîrdol 2001) and ‘industrial restructuring areas’: groups of industrial centres supported by Phare finance for innovatory SMEs in a bid to complement the RICOP programme for the downsizing and privatisation of ‘problem’ companies (Figure 10.1) (Popescu et al. 2003). There was also legislation encouraging local initiative (through fiscal incentives for local authorities or private companies) in setting up industrial parks: a significant decentralising measure. Finally the frontier regions can take advantage of Phare finance for cross-border cooperation (CBC) especially where ‘Euroregions’
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