The problem of the cause

Among all the many possible research subjects offered by the Cursus, the problem of the cause is one of the most appropriate in order to shed light on a series of primary issues:  the relationship between natural philosophy and metaphysics; the influence of Fonseca’s doctrines; the historical position of the Cursus in the process of philosophical deconstruction of Aristotelian physics towards Descartes. Moreover, the educational issue had been brought to the fore by Góis’s solution to the problem of the relationship between first cause and secondary causes, an age-old dilemma of Scholastic theologians. As a matter of fact, the Conimbricenses, who lacked that “Augustinian” sensitivity that we find in other Jesuits, vigorously stated the concurrence of first cause with secondary causes:  this issue, of course, comes across in the serious theological dispute de auxiliis, addressed by Conimbricenses from the point of view of natural philosophy in the Physics. The rejection both of the Augustinian hypothesis and of the contrary one by Durandus (who gave autonomy to the activity of the secondary causes, drawing on the opposite scheme) means promoting secondary causes in the name of their ability to cooperate with God, without being moved by him.