ABSTRACT
The end of authoritarian leadership under Ferdinand Marcos (SarDesai 1989, p. 200) in 1986 can be described as a turning point in the Philippines’ development towards a modern democracy (Hedman and Sidel 2001, p. 13) that also “marked the commencement of the third wave of democratization in Asia” (Croissant 2004, p. 161). Until then, the country had “witnessed periods of both development and decay” (Wurfel 1988, p. 325) due to a soft state with a lack of constitutional legitimacy and institutional capacity, but with ongoing neopatrimonial and neocolonial styles of rule (Wurfel 1988, p. 340). The constitution guarantees personal liberties and civil rights, but everyday life is still characterized by violent political conflicts, human rights violations and the abuse of fundamental civil rights (Werning and Reese 2007). The legacy of the system is still relevant to current politics. Although free and democratic elections are held regularly, the country’s economy and political system are dominated by a few traditionally influential families (Croissant 2002; Kreuzer 2009). In this political oligarchy, key families rule economic and social structures. Political parties do exist, but their power and competition in the political system are limited. Many of them only exist to support candidates during elections. Based on its constitution of 1987, the Philippines is a presidential republic with a parliamentary system. At least in theory, a robust system of checks and balances was established, with the president being both head of state and head of government (executive branch). The Congress (bicameral legislature) consists of the Senate (24 members elected by popular vote to serve 6-year terms) and the House of Representatives (212 members representing the country’s districts and 24 sectoral party-list members, elected by popular vote to serve 3-year terms). The Supreme Court (judiciary) represents the highest court in the country (Croissant 2015; Croissant and Schächter 2010; Gonzales 2001). The Philippines can be described as a “stable, but low quality democracy” (Case 2002, pp. 201-244) or even a defective democracy (Croissant 2015), characterized by low participation, political violence and a lack of political awareness. Local warlords and the complexity of local-national political interactions already shaped the political system before political reforms in 1991
(Sidel 1989), but even since then, different local elite structures have developed all over the Philippines, with similar institutional infirmities and capacity constraints having a significant impact on political decision-making (Lange 2010). Kreuzer (2009, p. 28) sees a “criminalized polity” with similarities to Mafia attitudes and structures, in which state institutions are open to criminal activities and are being transformed into resources for private governance. Corruption, lobbyism and political oppression lead to often non-transparent decisions. This is also true for renewable energy legislation and development, in which an unclear distribution of responsibilities, changing administrative rules and regulations, and the creation of new institutions are identified as major barriers to stronger policy outcomes. Many challenges to democratic governance are inherent in the Philippine political system and persist over decades – such as vote-buying (electoral clientelism) and the dominance of a few influential families (Quimpo 2005). Private and public interests overlap, and corruption and tax evasion have weakened the state (Reese 2007). Today’s widespread corruption and nepotism are also linked to the history of the Philippines, where colonial rule established a system of powerful local elites and families to exercise control over the population.
