ABSTRACT
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) exercised broad responsibility for UW in the east wing, and the same limitations that hampered its intelligence mission there affected its UW campaign as well. In addition to collection, analysis and UW, ISI was responsible for counter intelligence (CI) in East Pakistan. As more intelligence became available, ISI was able to predict that the Indian assault would take place in the last week of November. On 19 November, Army GHQ sent the latest ISI assessment to General Niazi in the east wing, which provided a detailed breakdown of the Indian order of battle and predicted that the invasion would take place on 20 November. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was also wary of his own intelligence community, which he referred to as an 'invisible power'; as early as 1974 he told colleagues the 'agencies' were bugging his Karachi residence telephones.
