ABSTRACT
As time wore on, the virtual nuclear deadlock between Tehran and Washington and its spillover impact were growing more visible. In a January 1976 interview with Kuwait’s Arabic daily Al-Siyassa , the Shah expressed rancor at the lack of progress on fi nalizing a nuclear accord:
we have given the Americans a pledge that we will use the nuclear reactors [obtained from the U.S.] for peaceful purposes and that we will not produce nuclear weapons. They have asked for more pledges. We believe there is no reason for such pledges. 1
Palpably determined to head off an unnecessary escalation, the White House stepped up its efforts to fi nd the lowest common denominator with Iran to conclude a civilian nuclear agreement as promptly as possible. Refl ecting the new sense of urgency, in February 1976, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft in an unmistakably blunt memorandum – addressed collectively to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and the Administrator of ERDA – relayed the President’s “anxious” desire to see an accord with Iran in a timely fashion. Despite its pressing tone, though, the memo indicated that Washington was still struggling to fully determine the conditions the Iranian would fi nd absolutely non-negotiable, let alone envisage workable scenarios to surmount them.
