Introduction

In this monograph, I shall argue that no doctrinal nor conceptual distinction can be drawn between what is orthodoxly known as standard complicity and what is orthodoxly known as joint enterprise/common purpose complicity. I shall argue that both have the same mental element and that the conduct element for both is either assistance or encouragement pursuant to section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 (hereinafter the Act of 1861). Because I argue that the conduct element of all complicity has to come within section 8 of the Act of 1861, I shall not dedicate a separate chapter to the topic of standard complicity. I shall explain the way in which contemporary scholars and courts have divided the two forms of complicity, but overall my examination of the conceptual problems with the conduct and mental elements in complicity does not rest on demonstrating that joint enterprise/common purpose complicity is a distinct doctrine.